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 The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), major 
airlines, and similar organizations that utilize a Safety Management System (SMS) 
are periodically implementing aviation technology changes. Typically, SMS 
derived and public perceived risk comprise two different processes with dissimilar 
influencing factors between the two processes. Organizational or public perceived 
risk level is the attitude derived from examining possible hazards and the 
probability of those hazards occurring to the organization, individual, equipment, 
society, or environment. The disparity between the organizational and public 
processes often causes public technology acceptance reluctance or rejection. Thus, 
the purpose of this paper is to identify and examine the processes and influencing 
factors that cause this disparity to better facilitate future aviation technology 
implementation.  
  
There have been numerous research studies examining technology 
acceptance with risk perception research roots going back to the 1960s to research 
the reasons for public reluctance or rejection (Sjöberg, 2000). Some examples of 
risk perception studies include the Wildavsky, & Dake (1990) study of theories of 
risk perception, the Whitfield, Rosa, Dan, & Dietz (2009) study of perceptions 
related to nuclear power and the Townsend (2013) study of the perception of risk 
in the public sector. Gupta, Fischer and Frewer (2012) reviewed 292 technology 
acceptance studies between 1977 and 2008 finding 31 determinant factors that 
influenced technology acceptance. Of the 31 factors, perceived risk was the most 
frequently occurring variable and the one that was investigated the most in those 
studies. Clothier, Greer, Greer and Mehta (2015) and La Porte and Metlay (1975a) 
also agree on the significance of perceived risk when compared to other factors. 
Dobbie and Brown (2014) echo the sentiment that perceived risk is a hindrance in 
technology acceptance. In their study of an attempted implementation of an 
integrated Australian urban water management approach, they found some 
similarities in determining factors between practitioners and the public. However, 
the two distinct evaluation processes of those factors resulted in different 
perceptions of risk between the two groups and created a public risk-averse culture 
(Dobbie & Brown, 2014).   
 
Aviation technology innovation has progressed from the first flight of the 
Wright Brothers to landing on the moon in just 63 years (Lawrence, 2014). 
However, disparity between the SMS and public processes coupled with dissimilar 
influencing factors has, at times, slowed or halted technology implementation. 
There are several historical examples to illustrate this. One example is Robert 
Goddard, a rocket pioneer, who in the mid-1930s developed a rocket with movable 
vanes and rudders. The U.S. government, a consolidated voice of public sentiment, 
had no interest until it was realized that the Germans had a sizable lead in rocket 
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 development when they became a threat some 20 years later during WWII 
(Lawrence, 2014). More recently, both chemical and nuclear technologies have 
evoked large public perceived risk assessments, essentially creating progress 
stagnation. Because of this stagnation, it has been difficult to find landfills, 
incinerators, and other chemical facility sites and virtually impossible to dispose of 
the wastes from chemical and nuclear operations and processes much to the dismay 
of technical experts (Slovic, 1997). More specifically, nuclear waste disposal has 
been a 30-year struggle, largely due to the public perception as being victims rather 
than beneficiaries of the technology. This resulted in a lack of trust in the 
government and an increased perceived risk by the public. As a result, progress 
implementing the Yucca Mountain project, the only proposed nuclear waste site, 
has been stopped, hence thwarting the expansion of nuclear power production 
(Slovic, Layman, & Flynn, 1991).  
 
Future technologies requiring technology implementation and; therefore, 
acceptance continue to be explored such as NASA’s movement toward a one-pilot 
airline cockpit. Even today, NASA realizes the effect of perceived risk, identifying 
it as one of three significant barriers to success (Warwick, 2013).  
 
The Problem 
 
The problem is twofold. First, SMS organizations, when implementing 
technology, use a reactive versus a proactive approach. Second, they do not grasp 
the magnitude of the public’s perceived risk due to lack knowledge of the public 
perceived risk derivation process and influencing factors. These two elements cause 
a disparity between organizational and public perceived risk levels resulting in 
technology implementation being slowed or halted. More specifically, the 
introduction of new technology involves some level of SMS defined risk to the 
public that is viewed as acceptable by the organization. However, the public may 
perceive the SMS defined risk at a more negative level than the implementing 
organization using SMS; thus, creating a disparity (Hunter, 2001). While perceived 
risk is recognized to some degree as an influencing factor in technology acceptance 
in today’s society, technology implementation is attempted concurrently with 
addressing public perceived risk in a reactive versus proactive approach. This 
reactive approach coupled with not grasping the magnitude of the impact of 
negative public perceived risk on technology acceptance has resulted in undesired 
end-states. By understanding SMS derived versus the public risk assessment 
processes and associated influencing factors of each, and if necessary, the 
methodology to change that perception once formed, public perceived risk can be 
targeted for either elimination or minimization to facilitate technology 
implementation. Additionally, using a proactive type approach, some public 
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 support predictability can be achieved when implementing new technology. Thus, 
toward this goal, SMS and public risk derivation processes, major SMS and public 
perceived risk influencing factors, along with the ability to influence public 
perceived risk once an attitude is formed, are examined in a literature review with 
conclusions and recommendations formed. 
 
A literature review process was used to summarize previous studies, inform 
the reader of the current status of the subject area, to identify relations, 
contradictions, and gaps in the literature, and finally to suggest the next research 
steps. The process used to derive the information for the literature review was 
conducted using the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Hunt Library databases 
and Google Scholar by using public perceived risk and perceived risk with 
technology acceptance in the search function. Initially, using public perceived risk 
in the search criteria yielded a total of 1,158 results from the Hunt Library 
databases. After a quick scan of the sources, the subject matter was surmised to be 
too broad in scope, because of non-relevant subject areas such as food, etc. After 
the search criteria were narrowed to include technology acceptance in the search 
function and peer reviewed selected as criteria, the results were narrowed to 738 
sources. Sources were then screened to omit those that could not be obtained, those 
that did not relate to technology acceptance or perceived risk, and those that did not 
include aviation, nuclear, information technology, or other potentially controversial 
technical areas. Google Scholar initially yielded 705 results, but the subject areas 
were too broad in scope, because of non-relevant subject matter, similar to what the 
Hunt Library search results yielded. After technology acceptance had been included 
in the search criteria, the search results yielded the final sources needed for the 
literature review. 
 
Literature Review 
 
SMS Derived Risk 
 
Derivation Process. To be able to bridge the differences between SMS and 
public perceived risk, it is first necessary to understand how the SMS risk 
assessment or perceived risk is derived. The SMS process starts with defining risk.  
 
Stolzer and Goglia (2015) use expected losses mated with the probability of 
those losses occurring to define risk. Parnell, Driscoll, and Henderson (2011) 
parallel this definition stating risk is a probabilistic event that when it occurs, causes 
undesired changes in technical performance, cost or schedule of events. Since risk 
has been defined, the next major factor to understand is safety risk management 
(SRM).  
3
Myers: SMS Derived vs. Public Perceived Risk in Aviation Technology Acceptance
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2016
  
In SMS or system design processes (SDP), SRM is used to identify, assess, 
and implement risk controls to reduce system variance caused by risks. SRM within 
the SMS construct uses subject matter experts (SME) to dissect processes, identify 
hazards, construct a safety risk probability table, build a risk severity table, define 
levels of risk, and create a risk matrix. SMS perceived risks are those thought to be 
relevant in the processes used in an organization utilizing SMS. They are derived 
from risk matrixes based on the overall severity of risks, taking into account 
probability and severity levels. Risk controls are then implemented to reduce risk 
level to an acceptable level. It should be noted that acceptable does not mean 
necessarily reducing the risk level to zero. These perceived risks and associated risk 
controls are then presented to management in a cost-benefit analysis approach for 
implementation decisions (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015). Parnell et al., (2011) describe 
a similar SMS risk derivation process in identifying, assessing, and mitigating risk. 
While they use a similar approach, slightly different tools are used such as a risk 
register, an impact on project table, and a probability impact table. Both risk 
management processes described are mostly objective in nature, accomplished by 
experts within an organization, and comprise expert perceived risks or a 
technological approach (Choi, 2013).  
 
While the SRM process is mostly objective in nature, because of having a 
defined process, there is still subjectivity introduced into the process, because 
individuals are involved. Therefore, emotions can influence the risk assessment 
levels (Slovic, 1997). This inherent subjectivity when assigning levels of severity 
and probability can prove detrimental when one individual or a group of individuals 
dominate the SRM process potentially skewing results.  
 
Major Influencing Factors of SMS Derived Risk. In conjunction with 
understanding how SMS perceived risk is derived, it is also important to grasp the 
significant influencing factors on the SRM process to have a total understanding of 
how an organization using SMS derives perceived risk. From a systems engineering 
perspective in an organization that utilizes SMS, the International Council on 
Systems Engineering recognizes four risk elements or influencing factors on the 
process that should be considered when making a system decision. These risk 
elements include technical, cost, schedule, and programmatic risk. Technical risk 
is the possibility that the system will not meet a required technical objective or 
functional requirement. Cost risk is the possibility that the system will exceed the 
programmed budget. Schedule risk is the possibility that the system will exceed the 
proposed timeline and associated milestones. Programmatic risk is the possibility 
of external factors affecting the development and/or deployment of a system 
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 (Parnell et al., 2011). These four elements used in the derivation process constitute 
the foundation of the SMS perceived risk assessment.     
   
Public Perceived Risk 
 
Derivation Process. To be able to mitigate the differences between SMS 
and public perceived risk to facilitate technology acceptance, one must not only 
have a good understanding of SMS derivation of perceived risk and influencing 
factors, but also a good understanding of how public perceived risk is derived and 
influencing factors. Required knowledge starts with understanding the two levels 
of perceived risk and cognitive process that the public uses to derive perceived 
risk.  
 
Dobbie and Brown (2014) distinguish two different levels of perceived 
risks: expert and layman. While SMS derived perceived risk, otherwise known as 
expert perceived risk, seems like an all-encompassing risk management approach, 
being mostly objective in nature, perceived risk derived by the public is mostly 
based on subjective norms including emotions, and is termed layman perceived risk 
(Dobbie & Brown, 2014). Young and Laughery (1994) complement this finding 
advocating that people use a simple, routine method to derive risk perception that 
remains identical regardless of technologies being considered. The process is 
relatively simple with perceived risk derivation occurring in an individual 
stakeholder’s mind without a formal SRM process. A stakeholder is either an 
organization or individual who has a vested interest in the technology being 
implemented (Parnell, Driscoll, &Henderson, 2011). In the context of this paper, 
stakeholders are the individuals who make up the public realm. 
 
Major Influencing Factors of Public Perceived Risk. Tied to the public 
perceived risk derivations are the risk elements and associated influencing factors 
considered in the public stakeholder’s cognitive process to derive perceived risk. 
Thus, understanding the elements and individual influencing factors coupled with 
the previously discussed public perceived risk derivation process allows an 
educated gap analysis comparison between SMS and public perceived risk. As 
discussed, the process the individual public stakeholder uses to derive perceived 
risk is relatively simple. However, complication ensues when examining the basic 
elements and the numerous, often subjective, influencing individual factors in an 
individual’s decision process, which at times, may seem irrational.  
 
Risk elements. Six identified elements form the system analysis framework 
of public perceived risk and include (a) security, (b) financial, (c) physical, (d) 
social, (e) time, and (f) performance risk. Security risk is the potential threat to an 
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 individual’s security. Financial risk is the likelihood of monetary loss. Physical 
risk is potential harm to an individual. Social risk refers to potential society 
disapproval. Time risk is time loss or inconvenience potential. Performance risk is 
system malfunction potential. These elements are then applied as applicable for the 
technology studied (Lee, 2009). While a lone individual considering these six 
elements has little effect on technology acceptance, individuals make up 
organizations, society groups, industry, and government which can have a profound 
impact on technology acceptance. While the six elements influence system 
analysis, individuals vary. Therefore, it is also necessary to study the variables that 
influence an individual’s risk perception formation to have a clear understanding 
of the public perceived risk influences. 
   
Lack of trust. The first major influencing variable is lack of trust. In public 
perceived risk studies, lack of trust in the organization using SMS to implement the 
technology has surfaced as one of the most common influencing factors. There are 
several contributing factors that researchers have identified as contributing to lack 
of trust. Whitfield, Rosa, Dan, & Dietz (2009), Townsend (2013), and Gupta et al. 
(2012) found that increased trust in government institutions decreased public 
perceived risk. An additional significant finding was that those individuals with 
traditional values have more trust in overseeing organizations. Trust is also related 
to age in that younger people are typically more trusting than older people. One of 
the biggest mistrust contributors is the perception that the parent organization 
utilizing SMS is allowing unacceptably high risk (Slovic, 1997). Additionally, in 
the public’s eyes, trust is founded on the organization’s sensitivity to their concerns, 
which can be solely based on emotions, not correct factual information (Lester, 
2000). Once the public trust is lost, it is very difficult to regain. Therefore, the focus 
of the organization using SMS must be on retaining it from the start (Petts, Homan, 
Breakwell, & Barnett (2002).  
 
Catastrophic events and mismanagement are other examples of factors that 
can initiate or deepen an already heightened feeling of public perceived risk or lack 
of trust. The Three Mile Island power plant partial nuclear meltdown in 1979 is an 
example of a catastrophic event that had a lasting negative impact on public trust 
(Whitfield et al., 2009). An example of mismanagement with lasting detrimental 
effects is that of the weapons plant in Hanford, Washington which in the 1940s and 
50s, released large amounts of radiation contamination into the local ground water 
which was unknown and undisclosed to the public until recently (Slovic et al., 
1991).  
 
Amount of control. Control is another major influencing factor on 
perceived risk. Lester (2000) states that the basis of the public accepting risk is how 
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 much control they have over implementing the technology. Further, he advocates 
that when technology is implemented without public involvement, there is a public 
perception of a lack of control since they were not involved in the decision-making 
process. This lack of control results in increased public perceived risk. Nordgren, 
Pligt, and Harreveld (2007) and Du, Keil, Mathiassen, Shen and Tiwana (2007) 
agree with Lester concluding that level of control is a major determinant of risk 
perception level. The more control individuals have, the lower the risk perception. 
Thus, facilitating technology acceptance through persuasion is easier when the 
public feels like they have a valid choice of options and are part of the process. 
Petts et al. (2002) echo these sentiments.  
 
Knowledge and experience. Knowledge of and experience with the 
technology being also assessed greatly influences public perceived risk. This 
conclusion is derived from the fact that individual knowledge and experience have 
a significant impact on individual mental models that use cognitive information 
processing to form levels of public perceived risk (Dobbie & Brown, 2014). 
Sjöberg (1999), and Gupta et al. (2012) found that people with more knowledge 
about the topic or technology tend to rate risk lower and vice versa. Wildavsky & 
Dake (1990) reason that this is true, because with knowledge, people will 
understand the technology being implemented more. In contrast, Visschers, 
Meertens, Passchier, and DeVries (2007) stated a “construction-integration” (p, 
716) cognitive process derives new information from the text by constructing a 
rough picture with fill-in information to form a representation. Given that, the 
mental representation in an individual’s mind is only as accurate as the information 
on which it is based. Related, Whitfield et al. (2009) and Wildavsky and Dake 
(1990) found people with a lower education level had a higher level of perceived 
risk. Conversely, Townsend (2013) and Wildavsky and Dake1990) found that 
people with college degrees rated themselves less at risk than lower educated 
respondents. Additionally, they found an influencing link between education level 
and attitude. Significantly, regarding experience, risk perception is derived from an 
overall experience level that rarely includes experience for the risk in question 
(Rogers, 1997). Realistic risk perception occurs when people have indirect or direct 
experience with the risks involved; otherwise, they must rely on other factors 
(Sjöberg, 2000).  
 
Individual norms/attitudes. Individual norms created by attitudes, 
individual beliefs and values form the individual public stakeholder’s core of 
perceived risk. Thus, in most instances, differences in risk perception between 
experts and laypersons can be largely attributed to individual norms (Dobbie & 
Brown, 2014). Attitudes form the basis of individual norms and are driven by 
perceived risk and trust in managing organizations. Once formed, attitudes are 
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 difficult to change unless individual influencing circumstances change. A good 
example is nuclear power where public resistance to its usage is high even today. 
However, even with high public resistance, 42% of respondents said nuclear power 
would be acceptable if there were an electricity shortage (Whitfield et al., 2009).  
A major influencing factor on individual norms is the prevalent attitude a public 
stakeholder holds. Wildavsky and Dake (1990) identify two prevalent attitudes of 
risk averseness and risk taking that bias perceived risk. People who are less willing 
to take risks are defined as risk averse, and those who are more willing to take risks 
are defined as risk taking.  
 
Individual values. Risk-taking is often a function of the values of an 
individual.  Whitfield et al. (2009), Gupta et al. (2012), and Sjöberg (2000) found 
a strong correlation between people with traditional values and greater technology 
acceptance support resulting in less public perceived risk. Those with an unselfish 
concern for others had less technology acceptance support and a higher public level 
of perceived risk. Also, with an unfamiliar subject area, Sjöberg (2000) found 
individuals fall back on norms and; therefore, it can be concluded that risk 
perception is largely a reflection of individual values. Thus, people rating new 
technology see mostly good in technology they like and mostly bad things in 
technology they do not like (Sjöberg, 2000).  
 
Culture theory. A major influence on individual internal beliefs that form 
public perceived risk is the culture theory. The 15-year-old risk perception culture 
theory postulates people fall into one of four categories governing individual 
internal beliefs and risk rating perception: hierarchists, individualists, egalitarians, 
and fatalists (Sjöberg, 2000). Choi (2013) and Wildavsky & Dake (1990) further 
define the categories. 
 
Hiearchists rate factors with the highest impact on social order as most 
dangerous. Individualists consider factors affecting individual freedom the most 
dangerous. Sanquist, Mahy & Morris (2008) echoes the individual freedom aspect. 
Egalitarians view factors affecting technology and environment as the highest risk. 
Finally, fatalists are powerless and willing to accept whatever fate risks impose.  
 
Cultural factors. The next major influences on public perceived risk are 
cultural factors. In conjunction with the four categories, public acceptance, and 
perception levels vary in different countries due to differing cultural factors 
(Clothier et. al, 2015; Choi, 2013). As part of the culture influence, social groups 
form a framework that is a major influence when individual public stakeholders 
compare their perceived risk ratings to family or other people in the social network 
(Sjöberg, 2000). Moussaïd (2013) supports this finding that individual risk 
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 judgments are trended towards individuals in the proximity to the social network 
which exhibits a strong influence on them.  
 
To be successful in influencing the public’s perceived risk level, it is 
essential to acknowledge the diverse risk perceptions of public stakeholders and to 
realize that even within the same group, it may difficult to facilitate implementation 
(Dobbie & Brown, 2014, La Porte & Metlay, 1975b). In fact, within the same 
group, some people may be indifferent and tranquil while others are very upset 
about perceived risk making it a very dynamic situation to deal with (Sjöberg, 
2000).  
 
Seidl, Moser, Stauffacher, & Krütli (2013) expand on this, listing four 
possible opinion clusters within a group which includes (a) risk-focused - rates risk 
high and benefit very low, (b) ambivalent – shows high ratings on both benefit and 
risk, (c) benefit-focused – rates benefit high and risk very low, and (d) indifferent – 
risk and benefit ratings are both at the moderate level, not feeling strongly either 
way.   
 
As Moussaïd (2013) argues that there are several possibilities of social 
groupings including consensus, polarization, and clustering that may be faced by 
those attempting to persuade the public. Consensus occurs when people agree and 
support a general opinion. Polarization occurs when two opposed population views 
emerge and co-exist. Clustering occurs when different groups form with like-
minded opinions (Moussaïd, 2013). La Porte and Metlay (1975a) believe that 
polarization is prevalent in society and; therefore, many technological issues will 
be in the political arena. In other words, through polarization, people choose a path 
to support their way of life (Wildavsky & Dake1990).  
 
Media communication. Media communication is another influencing factor 
on public perceived risk. The most common types of media communication include 
pictures and text communication which can be very influential in forming public 
perceived risk. Pictures affect perceived risk by creating a cognitive image often 
accompanied times by strong emotions. For example, nuclear war images 
negatively affected perceived risk regarding nuclear power (Slovic et al., 1991). 
Clothier et al. (2015) and Sanquist et al. (2008) found that media communication 
can be very influential in forming perceived risk opinions, especially when there is 
little subject knowledge. Moussaïd (2013) supports this premise stating that 
individuals often seek media information to fill knowledge gaps with the amount 
dictated by existing knowledge. Sjöberg (2000) echoes this but rates it less 
significant compared to other factors.  
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 When text media is presented by an organization utilizing SMS, 
terminology is important, because it often invokes negative connotations, thus 
increasing perceived risk. For example, nuclear waste disposal terms such as dump, 
nuclear, or waste have produced negative results. For some people, just the word 
nuclear invokes negative images of nuclear war with associated effects while 
invoking a dread or fear factor (Slovic et al., 1991). Also, terminology presented in 
one location may not be appropriate in another (Petts et al., 2002). Interestingly, 
Clothier et al. (2015) contrarily found no link between terminology and perceived 
risk. Simply presenting media in the wrong context can also present problems. The 
influence of incorrect context was demonstrated by a hypothetical lung cancer study 
based on choosing between two therapies. When the presentation context of the two 
therapy choices was changed, results dramatically changed dropping from 44% to 
18% of those choosing one therapy over the other (Slovic, 1997). This is known as 
affect heuristic, because if people are upset, they do not think rationally. The other 
way to describe the effect is how people feel will determine how they think 
(Greenberg & Lowrie, 2014; Gupta et al., 2012). Townsend (2013) describes loss 
aversion bias as another phenomenon framing influence. That is, to rate risk 
associated with failure higher than associated benefits with success. This bias 
instills a natural resistance to change that must be overcome (Townsend, 2013). A 
related significant finding is people associate unknown with known risks to find a 
relationship based on experience they can understand. Thus, occasionally people 
use vaguely related or non-related risks to derive opinions. There are four reasons 
for this that include (a) grasping consequences and severity, (b) to show that other 
risks have been tolerated, (c) to illustrate there are also benefits to risks, and (d) to 
show that risks can be resolved (Visschers et al., 2007).  
 
Gender. Gender is the last major influencing factor. Concerning gender, 
Whitfield et al. (2009) in their nuclear power study, found that women are risk-
averse and have a higher level of perceived risk than men. Dobbie and Brown 
(2014) and Townsend (2013) agree with this assertion.  
  
Age. For age, Joyce, Ferguson, & Weinstein (2009) in a study of Mars 
missions determined that school children were more likely to have a higher 
perceived risk level than adults primarily due to lack of life experiences and young 
people are more likely to change their values and beliefs than their adult 
counterparts. 
 
Changing Public Stakeholder Perceived Risk Once an Attitude is formed 
 
Once formed, public perceived risk changes very slowly even when new 
information is introduced by an organization using SMS (Dobbie & Brown, 2014). 
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 Many attempts to change an already formed attitude failed primarily because the 
public interrelationship was not handled properly with community acceptance 
either ignored or diminished. One example was the proposed nuclear waste site at 
Yucca Mountain, Nevada which was briefly discussed earlier. In this instance, the 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) selected the Yucca Mountain site as the only 
candidate to store nuclear waste assuming the effort would be successful. However, 
the people of Nevada convinced the state legislature to pass an assembly bill 
prohibiting storage of nuclear waste in Nevada. Additionally, a public poll indicated 
that 80.1% thought the state “should do all it can to stop the repository” (Slovic, 
Layman, & Flynn, 1991, p. 1). The Yucca Mountain incident illustrates the ultimate 
power of the public’s perceived risk of being able to stop technology 
implementation. Therefore, when technology is being implemented, experts should 
strive for a mutual understanding of public perceived risks to facilitate acceptance 
(Lester, 2000).  
 
Public interaction viewed as an opportunity. Public interaction with an 
organization that utilizes SMS should be viewed as an opportunity rather than an 
obligation. That is, communication should be focused on influence versus 
information, and facts not elevated over the public’s feelings. Opportunity means 
going beyond minimal regulation requirements to build community rapport. Focus 
is needed on persuasion rather than just presenting facts which mean being personal 
versus technical and listening to subjective reason. Persuasion is driven by 
emotional, not technical response and involves basic steps (Lester, 2000). This 
methodology includes (a) understanding public thinking, (b) building credibility by 
showing concern for citizens, (c) confronting public perceptions and feelings by 
validating emotions, (d) using one-on-one meetings with the staunchest opponents, 
(e) tempering the amount of information with the need for information, and (f) 
involving the public in planning and implementation (Lester, 2000). Zwik (2005) 
suggest that perceived risk initially derived by the public is often forgotten a short 
time later. This phenomenon is known as the “switching effect” which reinforces 
Lester’s point of viewing public interaction as an opportunity to change public 
perceived risk.  
 
Trust restoration. To be able to change public perceived risk, a 
fundamental requirement is trust restoration. Trust is built on two-way 
communication, transparency and tight risk controls. This is especially true when 
an organization that utilizes SMS is implementing new technology as individuals 
have little subject knowledge regarding complex technical systems (Dobbie & 
Brown, 2014). Once trust has been destroyed, long incident-free periods are 
required to recover. Nuclear examples discussed earlier are good examples of this. 
11
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 To address this, trust restoration must be given priority by increasing public 
involvement in the decision-making process (Slovic et al., 1991). 
 
Public participation. An organization that uses SMS and excludes public 
participation is often viewed by the public as one attempting to hide critical facts 
(Lester, 2000). Thus, some researchers advocate more public participation in the 
SRM process since doing so provides the needed elements of trust and control 
(Lester, 2000, Slovic et al. 1991). It also allows more democratic decision-making, 
improves technical assessment relevance, and facilitates public acceptance (Slovic, 
1997). However, this approach is not without drawbacks. Public representatives 
involved in the SRM process for long periods may be out of touch with public 
wants. Additionally, care must be taken that public representatives do not have a 
biased personal agenda versus representing the public as a whole. Finally, to be 
relevant contributors in the SRM process, those involved as public stakeholders 
require extensive training for unfamiliar jargon and new material (Rogers, Sharp, 
& Preece, 2011). 
   
Communication. Communication from an organization using SMS to the 
public is another major facet of changing public stakeholder perceived risk. There 
are several communication methods such as broadcast media, printed information, 
and face-to-face interaction. Clothier et al. (2015), found media to be very 
influential in individual perceived risk when little is known about the subject. 
Media timing is critical, though, because once perceived risk attitudes are formed, 
media has little effect. Therefore, it is imperative that proactive media include a 
balance of applications, capabilities, risks, and benefits to be effective in perceived 
risk forming stages (Clothier et al., 2015). The second media form is printed 
material designed to inform the public about unknown risks ideally spanning the 
gap between expert risk and public or layman perceived risk similar to an SMS gap 
analysis (Visschers et al., 2007). Dobbie and Brown, (2014) agree, but instead use 
the theoretical mental model approach. If media or printed information fails, then 
using face-to-face communication may be the most effective (Lester, 2000). 
Ultimately, the risk communication goal should be to garner and incorporate public 
risk perception information into the risk assessment decisions of the organization 
utilizing SMS (Rogers, 1997). 
 
Conclusions 
 
Research has shown, and history has proven, that perceived risk is a 
significant negative variable affecting technology acceptance success (Clothier, 
Greer, Greer and Mehta, 2015; Dobbie and Brown, 2014; Gupta, Fischer, and 
Frewer, 2012; La Porte and Metlay, 1975a; Sjöberg, 2000). More specifically, the 
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 disparity between SMS and public stakeholder processes coupled with dissimilar 
influencing factors has, at times, frequently slowed or halted technology 
implementation. Five other major conclusions can be drawn when comparing SMS 
and public perceived risk that must be considered as well to ensure acceptance 
success.  
 
First, perceived risk derived by organizational experts utilizing SMS is 
fundamentally different than perceived risk derived by individuals. SMS derived 
risk is mostly objective in nature, because of proven processes with some 
subjectivity, because individuals are involved. However, individual perceived risk 
is just the opposite being mostly subjective in nature derived solely by the 
individual with some objectivity. Because of this, often SMS experts view their 
process as the ultimate solution, while in the public’s eyes, their solution is just as 
relevant. Thus, an organization using SMS must realize their solution has flaws, 
and that the public solution is relevant. Therefore, persuasion versus just factual 
information must be used to garner public support for the technology that is 
implemented.    
 
Second, when SMS and public influencing elements are compared, there 
are both similarities and differences. The similar elements between SMS and the 
public include cost and financial as well as technical and performance. The unique 
elements to SMS include schedule and programmatic. The elements unique to the 
public include security, physical, social and time. The unique elements of SMS and 
those of the public further highlight that there is a fundamental difference between 
the two risk derivation processes. The significance of this is that the organization 
utilizing SMS must understand what the elements are for both processes, especially 
those unique to the public, and address them to win over public support and 
minimize public perceived risk.  
 
Third, decoding public risk perception is problematic at best, because it is 
affected not only by the six elements discussed earlier, but other major influencing 
subjective factors on the individual including (a) lack of trust, (b) amount of control, 
(c) individual knowledge and experience of the technology being implemented, (d) 
individual norms, (e) individual values, (f) culture theory, (g) cultural factors, (h) 
media communication, and (i) gender. It is important to realize from this conclusion 
that given the numerous major influencing factors coupled with varying individual 
personality characteristics makes stereotyping all public stakeholders is impossible 
and influencing public perceived risk very difficult.  
 
Fourth, coupled with these six elements and nine factors, it is essential to 
understand diverse risk perceptions of stakeholders using the culture theory and 
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 various social groups during public acceptance to facilitate implementation even 
within the same group. This is significant because it makes understanding 
individual public stakeholder perceived risk even more difficult. It also reinforces 
the fact that just because people are in a group that has a stated position, does not 
mean assumptions can be made about individual perceived risk levels within the 
group.  
 
Fifth, changing perceived risk once formed is possible, but very difficult. 
There is agreement on the methods to accomplish this which includes using 
persuasion or influence versus presenting just factual information, building trust, 
and allowing the public to participate in the technology implementation strategy. 
However, there is disagreement regarding the effectiveness of media 
communication as an effective influencing factor. Clothier et al. (2015), Moussaïd, 
M. (2013) and Sanquist et al. (2008) concluded that the media could be a significant 
influencing factor. Sjöberg (2000) differed concluding it was not as significant as 
other influencing factors. In conjunction with these tools of influence, being 
proactive, truthful and understanding to facilitate success are keys to realizing a 
fundamental shift from an expert technological fact-based approach to one of a 
subjective perception and social acceptance.  
 
Often, experts gauge public perceived risk as false, concluding that it is 
based on misunderstanding and ignorance which then creates animosity. The better 
approach is to realize public perception once formed, while faulty, is valid in the 
public’s eye and that expert risk assessment involves subjectivity and; therefore, is 
an estimate only. Thus, organizations implementing risk management strategies 
must take the time to empathize and understand to reshape public concerns given 
the public trend is becoming more, not less concerned about risk.  
 
It is crucial to have an understanding of SMS derived versus public risk 
assessment processes and associated influencing factors. Then, if necessary, to 
apply the knowledge and associated methodology to target public stakeholder 
perceived risk for either elimination or minimization to facilitate technology 
implementation.      
 
Recommendations 
 
This research process highlighted a literature gap in the area of aviation 
specific technology acceptance studies. Thus, more perceived risk research is 
needed to fill the aviation related literature gap incorporating major influencing 
factors. Additionally, there has been much success in applying and validating 
technology acceptance models such as the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM), 
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 the Theory of Planned Behavior Model (TPB) and others in information 
technology. Future research should include an adaptation of one or more of these 
models for aviation specific technology use. Then, the information in this paper, 
along with prior research can be used in conjunction with the new model by 
organizations utilizing SMS to eliminate or mitigate public perceived risk to an 
acceptable level to enhance aviation technology acceptance.  
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